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TWINING'S COMPLAINT

Dennis Patterson'
It is a great pleasure to read and comment upon William
Twining's lucid and insightful analysis of the current state of
jurisprudence. I consider it a stroke of good fortune to have been
present at the IVR meeting in Granada, Spain when Twining first
presented this article as a lecture. I distinctly recall how everyone in
the grand hall was engaged by the lecture and lined up to ask
questions and continue the dialogue on a topic for which most
everyone has an opinion - the future of jurisprudence.
In the article that grows out of the lecture, I find a great deal
to which I am sympathetic. In general, Twining's call for a less
parochial jurisprudence is one with which I am in agreement. His
sensitivities to the challenges posed by globalization and the push for
an increasingly cosmopolitan state of law are likewise both timely and
sensible suggestions.2 But, while globalization is a central theme in
his article, 3 Twining is not interested in globalization as such.
Globalization is simply the latest context in which Twining renews
his long-standing complaint against analytic jurisprudence. This is
his charge:
For many years I have argued that Herbert Hart and
his followers revolutionized the methods of analytical
jurisprudence, but they also tended to accept
uncritically the agenda of questions they inherited,
Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law (Camden)
and Department of Philosophy (New Brunswick). Thanks to Alexandra George,
John Oberdiek and Jefferson White for comments on a draft of this comment.
2 For my own views on the importance of globalization in the context of
international trade and the need for a new legal regime, see Ari Afilalo and
Dennis Patterson, Statecraft, Trade and the Order of States, 6 CHI. J. OF INT'L L.

725-759 (2006).
3 Here is how Twining sums up his argument with respect to globalization: "The
central argument of this paper contends that both the practices and discipline of
law are in fact becoming more cosmopolitan, and that jurisprudence as the
theoretical part of law as a discipline needs to face these challenges." See
William Twining, General Jurisprudence, 15 U. MIAMI. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
1, 10 (2007) (hereinafter GeneralJurisprudence).
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which in turn was based on a narrow conception of
law that centered on legal doctrine and its
presuppositions. Although they treated law as a social
phenomenon, their work proceeded "in almost
complete isolation from contemporary social theory
and from work in socio-legal studies, with little overt
concern for the law in action. ' 4
Analytic jurisprudes fail to appreciate the subtleties of context
in striving for a universal account of the nature of law. As Twining
sees it, analytic jurisprudence has tended to remain aloof from the
particulars of doctrine and context. In the course of a succinct reprise
of one of the theses in Nicola Lacey's account of the relationship of
philosophy to sociology, Twining tells us what is missing from the
discussion in analytic jurisprudence:
[L]egal concepts and legal doctrine can only be
understood in the institutional and practical context of
their use and [for example] an account of causation or
corporate responsibility in English law is likely not
merely to be incomplete but misleading if these
contextual factors are ignored .... Many of us have

argued for many years that law, including legal
doctrine 5 and concepts, needs to be understood in
context.
Simply stated, Twining's complaint is that analytic
jurisprudence refuses to take sociology seriously. He correctly sees
the pursuit of a general conception of the "nature of law" during the
last 50 plus years of analytic jurisprudence as a steady move away
from the particulars of legal practice and toward increased
abstraction.6 But I can hear my friends in analytic jurisprudence
4 Id.at

26.
5Id. at 30, discussing Nicola Lacey, AnalyticalJurisprudenceversus Descriptive

Sociology Revisited, 84 TEX. L. REv. 945 (2006) (hereinafter Analytical
Jurisprudence).
6For a survey of some of the work of the last twenty-five years, see Les Green,
General Jurisprudence: A 25"h Anniversary Essay, 25 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUDIES,

565-580 (2005).
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saying: "So what? We don't do sociology." Of course, despite their
differences, Twining and analytic jurisprudes seem to share the view
that philosophy and sociology are different enterprises.
With respect to their differences, Twining distinguishes
philosophy and sociology using Lacey's critique of Hart, specifically,
Hart's reluctance to take law seriously from a sociological point of
view. According to Lacey, Hart - and those who follow him 7 - try
"to maintain a sharp distinction between philosophical and empirical
questions. ' 8 Twining elaborates his view of the distinction by
reprising Lacey's account of the shortcomings of Hart and Honor6's
book Causation in the Law.9 Lacey asks rhetorically "(W]hat kind of
book would Causation have been had been had it been written by a
legal theorist inspired by Wittgenstein rather than by Austin?'"
Lacey answers:
We could expect it to have explored questions such as
the institutional factors which restrict the extent to
which judges will appeal to pragmatic or policy
arguments - their sensitivity to the need to legitimate
their decisions, their (system-specific) understanding
of their constitutional role and so on. As an empirical
matter, these institutional factors shape not only the
appeal to policy in causation cases but also the
development of causal concepts themselves.'
Twining observes, correctly, that Lacey's point was a general
critique "of attempts to draw a sharp line between philosophical and
7 See Twining, GeneralJurisprudence,supra note 3, at 27 (mentioning Joseph

Raz)
8 See id. (citing Lacey, Analytical Jurisprudence,supra note 5).
9 H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORt, CAUSATION INTHE LAW (1959).
'0 NICOLA LACEY, A LIFE OF H.L.A. HART: THE NIGHTMARE AND THE NOBLE

DREAM at 218 (2004). Of course, there are works of jurisprudence written from
the point of view of the later Wittgenstein. Here are two of them: DENNIS
PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH (1996); PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION (1991).
" Twining, GeneralJurisprudence,supra note 3, at 29 (quoting NICOLA LACEY,
A LIFE OF

(2004)).

H.L.A.

HART: THE NIGHTMARE AND THE NOBLE DREAM at

218
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social perspectives on law .
,"'2 In his review of Lacey's book,
philosopher Thomas Nagel was sharply critical of Lacey's criticism
of Hart. He went so far as to suggest that Lacey simply does not
know, or has failed to recognize, what philosophy is about.13 It is
Twining's reaction to and comment upon Nagel's criticism that
provides insight into Twining's view of the distinction between
philosophy and sociology. Twining writes:
[Nagel] completely misses the point of [Lacey's]
criticism, however, which is that legal concepts and
legal doctrine can only be understood in the
institutional and practical context of their use, and that
an account of causation or corporate responsibility in
English law is likely not merely to be incomplete but
misleading if these contextual factors are ignored. For
12

id.
13

Nagel wrote:

Lacey seems to have a weak grasp of what philosophy is.
Hart's work consists not merely in analysis of doctrinal
language, but in the philosophical elucidation of institutions,
practices, concepts, and forms of reasoning and justification
that are the most basic and general elements of law and
politics. He is acutely aware of the importance of institutions
and power relations, but the questions he addresses cannot be
answered by social and historical study . . . . [F]or all
philosophers, the understanding they seek has to be pursued
primarily by reasoning rather than empirical observation,
because it is concerned with concepts and methods that enable
us to describe and think about what we can observe. These are
not mutually exclusive approaches or forms of understanding:
they address different questions, and they operate at different
levels of abstraction and generality.
Thomas Nagel, The Central Questions, LONDON REV. BOOKS, Feb. 3, 2005, at
27. Nagel's criticisms caused something of a stir. The TLS received and
published letters by Hart's daughter, Joanna Ryan, and philosophers Simon
Blackburn and Jeremy Waldron. For the letters and Nagel's response, see
Joanna Ryan, Letter to the Editor, LONDON REV. BOOKS, Feb. 17, 2005 at 4;
Simon Blackburn & Jeremy Waldron, Letter to the Editor, LONDON REV.
BOOKS, Feb. 17, 2005 at 4; Thomas Nagel, Letter to the Editor, LONDON REV.
BOOKS, Feb. 17, 2005 at 4.
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the same reason, abstracted accounts of "legal
reasoning" or "adjudication" are likely to be overgeneralized or inaccurate in other ways if differences
in institutional and other contexts are overlooked. The
extent to which such contextual factors are similar or
uniform - both across and within jurisdictions - is an
empirical one. Philosophers who wish to understand
legal phenomena need to equip themselves with local
14
knowledge.
Twining's complaint is with philosophy that sees itself as the
master discipline, possessed of unique methods and tools, all in the
service of "conceptual analysis." On this view, philosophy is the
"master discipline" in that it uses the tools of philosophical analysis to
police the discourse of other disciplines as the latter attempt to come
to conclusions about the way the world is. So, for example, when a
scientist purports to have explained a phenomenon, it is the task of the
philosopher of science to take the very idea of "explanation" and
articulate the degree to which the scientist has or has not provided an
"explanation," properly understood.
Twining's complaint that philosophy fails to understand
words "in context" is regarded by some philosophers (Nagel is a good
example 5 ) as a failure to understand the enterprise of philosophy.
Philosophy is acontextualfor a reason: its aspiration is to identify the
features of a practice (like law) or a concept (like explanation) that are
essential to that thing being what it is. All too many philosophers
think the task of philosophy is to identify the necessary and sufficient
conditions for the application of concepts. For them, context is just
fodder for generalization. The meaning of concepts lies not in their
use (in context) but in features of the concept which transcend the
local and contextual.
There is an ironic dimension to Twining's complaint with
analytic jurisprudence.
His complaint comes at a time when
philosophy - especially the conception of philosophy advanced by
14
15

Twining, General Jurisprudence,supra note 3, at 30.
In fact, Nagel is so extreme in his views that he attributes to Wittgenstein the

view that "all thought is an illusion."
NOWHERE 107 (1986).

THOMAS

NAGEL,

THE VIEW FROM
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philosophers like Nagel - is under sustained attack. The rise of
"philosophical naturalism," championed by the American philosopher
Willard V.0. Quine has, in the view of some, dealt a severe blow to
the idea of philosophy as a first-order discipline. Since the 1950s,
philosophical naturalism has sought to undermine precisely the sort of
conceptual analysis to which Twining directs his attention.
According to Quine, there is no distinction between conceptual and
'6
empirical truths. Quineans reject the idea of "conceptual analysis"'
as first philosophy.
Quinean naturalism is just one position among several in a
much larger debate in contemporary analytic jurisprudence. This
debate - known as "the methodology debate" - is a serious, selfreflective discussion within analytic jurisprudence about the future of
conceptual analysis and the degree to which jurisprudence can be
entirely descriptive or whether it "necessarily" involves normative
The methodology debate within analytic general
dimensions.
jurisprudence is not about the traditional question "What is law?,"
but, more self-consciously, "How should one do philosophy of law?"
This second-order debate is related to the older first-order debate
about the nature of law in that the methodology debate began with the
question of whether purely descriptive jurisprudence is possible, or
whether it instead must presuppose normative and specifically moral
commitments.17 As a positivist, Hart argued that description of the
law without justification of the law is possible. Conversely, Dworkin,
John Finnis' 8 and Stephen Perry, 19 have insisted that jurisprudence
must engage in moral justification.
notes that Brian Leiter "has reinterpreted legal realism in terms of
naturalist philosophy, one version of which treats conceptual analysis as
continuous with empirical inquiry in the social sciences." Twining, General
Jurisprudence,supra note 3, at 31 (emphasis supplied). To the contrary, Leiter
claims that Quine's repudiation of "the" analytic/synthetic distinction eliminates
conceptual analysis. See Brian Leiter, Beyond the Hart/Dworkin Debate: The
16 Twining

Methodology Problem in Jurisprudence,28 AM. JUR. JURIS. 17, 44 (2003). For
discussion, see John Oberdiek and Dennis Patterson, Moral Evaluation and
Conceptual Analysis in JurisprudentialMethodology in Current Legal Issues:
Law and Philosophy (forthcoming 2007).
17 For

a clear and concise account of the debate thus far, see Julie Dickson,
Methodology in Jurisprudence:A CriticalSurvey, 10 Legal Theory 117, 117-56
(2004).
18See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 3-4 (1984).
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Although the methodology debate now underway in analytic
jurisprudence is not quite the debate Twining would like to have, and
a rapprochement between philosophers and sociologists may not be at
hand, things are moving in the right direction. 20 At least there is
reason
for
hope.

19 See Stephen R. Perry, Hart's Methodological Positivism, in HART'S
POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT OF LAW 311-54

(Jules Coleman ed. 2001).
For discussion of the possible role of philosophical naturalism in such a
rapprochement, see Dennis Patterson, Notes on the Methodology Debate: Why
Sociologists Might be Interested, in LAW AND SOCIOLOGY 254-258 (Michael
Freeman ed., 2006).
20

I

